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Job losers exhibit significant heterogeneity in wealth holdings and in the marginal
propensity to consume transitory income. We consider potential sources of this
heterogeneity, whether (some of) the unemployed face borrowing constraints, and the
implications of this heterogeneity for unemployment insurance. We show theoretically
how the optimal benefit can depend significantly on borrowing constraints, and on other
(non-precautionary) savings motives. We report empirical evidence that (i) a quarter of
job losers cannot borrow for current consumption, (ii) this constraint is binding for a
much smaller fraction, and (iii) that “excess sensitivity” is not limited to the constrained.
JEL Classification: H53, D91
Keywords:  unemployment, savings, credit constraints, life-cycle, consumption,  
unemployment insurance.
Résumé
Celles et ceux qui viennent de perdre leur emploi accusent une forte hétérogénéité dans la
détention de leur richesse et dans leur propension marginale à consommer leur revenu
transitoire. Nous examinons les sources potentielles de cette hétérogénéité, lorsque (une
partie de) ces personnes font face à des contraintes de crédit, et leurs implications pour le
système d’assurance chômage. Notre modèle théorique montre que le niveau optimal des
prestations d’assurance chômage peut dépendre de façon significative de l’existence de
contraintes de crédit, ainsi que d’autres motifs (non-précautionnels) d’épargne. Notre
analyse empirique met en évidence que (i) un quart de celles ou ceux qui ont perdu leur
emploi ne “peuvent” recourir à l’emprunt pour soutenir leur consommation courante (ii)
cette contrainte n’est effective que pour une fraction beaucoup plus petite de ces derniers,
et (iii) que cet “excès de sensitivité” ne se limite pas aux personnes affectées par ces
contraintes.  
JEL Classification: H53, D91
Mots Clés: chômage, épargne, contraintes de crédit, cycle de vie, consommation,
assurance-chômage.II n t r o d u c t i o n
A literature has emerged recently that studies the ability of households to smooth consumption in the
face of transitory ﬂuctuations in income, particularly those ﬂuctuations that result from unemployment.
This empirical literature speaks to the cost of business cycles (and the incidence of those costs). It also
speaks to the consumption smoothing beneﬁts of unemployment insurance and hence to the optimal level
of provision of such public insurance. In our reading, the striking feature of this literature is that job
losers exhibit signiﬁcant heterogeneity in wealth holdings and in the marginal propensity to consume out
of transitory income. In this paper, we consider potential sources of this heterogeneity, whether (some of)
the unemployed face borrowing constraints, and the implications of this heterogeneity for unemployment
insurance.
Dynarski and Gruber (1997) show that consumption changes are more highly correlated with income
changes among households headed by high school dropouts and high school graduates than among house-
holds headed by college graduates, and they ﬁnd similar diﬀerences by wealth quartile. Gruber (2001)
analyses wealth data from U.S. Survey of Income and Program Participation and documents enormous
heterogeneity in wealth holdings around job loss. He reports that the median worker has assets suﬃcient
to ﬁnance about two thirds of the income loss from an unemployment spell, but that almost a third of
workers cannot ﬁnance even 10% of that income loss. Browning and Crossley (2001) report that while
the mean fall in (total) consumption with unemployment in their Canadian data is 14%, a quarter of the
job-losing households report no fall in consumption and 10% of households report that consumption fell
by more than half. They also ﬁnd that the marginal propensity to consume out of unemployment beneﬁt
income varies between 0 and .25 for diﬀerent groups, where the groups are deﬁned by family type and (liq-
uid) wealth. Sullivan (2002) and Bloemen and Stancanelli (2002), using measures of food consumption in
U.S. and U.K data respectively, also document signiﬁcant variation in the marginal propensity to consume
out of transitory income across job losers with diﬀerent wealth levels.
In comparing the behavior of agents with diﬀerent levels of assets, these studies are following the
strategy employed by Zeldes (1989) and Runkle (1991) to study “excess sensitivity” (of consumption to
income) in the general population. Those without liquid assets are considered to be more likely to be
constrained, and the fact that they have a higher marginal propensity to consume out of transitory income
is taken to be evidence of borrowing constraints (Dynarski and Gruber, 1997; Browning and Crossley, 2001;
1Sullivan, 2002; Bloemen and Stancanelli, 2002).
This empirical heterogeneity - and the credit constraint interpretation it is usually given in this literature
- raises a number of important issues. First, the broader literature on consumption and savings has recently
emphasized that such “excess sensitivity” need not indicate borrowing constraints if preferences do not take
the certainty-equivalent form. Research surveyed by Carroll (2001) emphasizes that a precautionary savings
motive leads to concave consumption functions and high marginal propensities to consume out of current
income at low wealth levels. Moreover, in splitting samples by wealth levels, the empirical literature on
consumption smoothing during unemployment is essentially treating wealth levels at job loss as exogenous.
Theoretically, savings should respond to the degree of insurance provided by other sources. Empirical
support for this proposition has been provided by Engen and Gruber (2001), who demonstrate that wealth
levels respond to the generosity of unemployment insurance.
Second, many models that are used to trade oﬀ the consumption smoothing beneﬁts of unemployment
insurance against the moral hazard cost cannot accommodate either the heterogeneity in wealth levels
at job loss or the heterogeneity in marginal propensity to consume that is apparent in the data. In
addition, some do not allow a role for borrowing constraints. For example, the canonical model of optimal
unemployment beneﬁts with savings is the two period model of Bailey (1978). Because of its transparency
and useful insights, the Bailey model is still used to assess empirical estimates of the costs and beneﬁts
of unemployment insurance (see for example Gruber, 1997, and Chetty, 2004). However, as we discuss
below, the only reasonable interpretation of the structure of the Bailey model is that the unemployed have
complete access to credit markets. In addition, because agents in the Bailey model have a single savings
motive (precautionary saving against the probability of job loss between the two periods) it is diﬃcult to
see how one might relate the Bailey model to the substantial heterogeneity in wealth levels apparent in the
data. As we discuss below, recent papers suﬀer similar limitations.
From the point of view of an individual worker, the value of unemployment insurance will depend
on how diﬃcult it is to self-insure. This in turn will depend on the cost of borrowing (credit market
imperfections) and on the cost of (precautionary) saving. Lentz (2003) has recently emphasized that
optimal beneﬁt rates are sensitive to the rate of return on savings. A high rate of return makes it attractive
to hold wealth and hence self-insurance is not costly. However, the cost of savings depends not only on
market rates of return but also on current needs and the timing of income, as well as rates of time
2preference. Heterogeneity in any of these factors will translate into heterogeneity in the cost of saving.
Market imperfections mean heterogeneity in the cost of saving passes through to heterogeneity in the value
of unemployment insurance. Thus the empirical heterogeneity which the literature has documented may
indicate substantial heterogeneity in the value of unemployment insurance, and this should be taken into
account in an assessment of optimal beneﬁts.
In this paper we explore these issues in two ways. First, we construct a transparent (ﬁnite horizon)
life-cycle consumption model, extending Bailey (1978). In our model, job loss is exogenous, the unemployed
can invest in subsequent earnings capacity, insurance is partly from public unemployment insurance and
partly from private savings. Crucially, we introduce (i) a retirement savings motive, (ii) variation in the
timing of job loss, and (iii), the possibility of (exogenous) borrowing constraints. We use this model to
illustrate the connections between credit market imperfections, the cost of precautionary saving and the
role of unemployment insurance. We are able to show theoretically that in the presence of borrowing
constraints, unemployment insurance may have a beneﬁt that derives from smoothing consumption over
time, in addition to the beneﬁt in the Bailey model (the latter derives entirely from smoothing over
states). As one might expect, this additional potential beneﬁt can raise the optimal replacement rate.
Having a second savings motive (retirement) provides a starting point for thinking about how the wealth
heterogeneity in the data might arise. When the retirement savings motive is strong, self-insurance is
less costly because retirement savings can serve double duty - they can also serve as a buﬀer stock to
smooth consumption. In our model, optimal replacement rates vary substantially with the strength of the
retirement saving motive and age at job loss (from less than 20 percent to almost 60 percent) .
Motivated both by the issues raised above, and by our model, we then use an unusual Canadian
survey to investigate empirically holdings of liquid assets, credit market access, and consumption growth
among recent job losers. The survey is of individuals who lost their jobs in particular windows in time and
collects a broad range of information. Unlike surveys that interview a population sample at regular intervals
(like the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics or Survey of Income and Program Participation), our survey
collects data on ﬁnancial circumstances and consumption just prior t oj o bl o s sa sw e l la sa ti n t e r v a l sa f t e r
job loss. To assess the importance of borrowing constraints, we have a unique combination of questions
including subjective questions about whether individuals are able to borrow and want to borrow, as well
as objective questions on their success at obtaining credit since job loss. The latter are similar to questions
3in the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances which have been analyzed by Jappelli (1990) (for the general
population). Jappelli et al. (1998) used data from the Survey of Consumer Finances and a two-sample
instrumental variables procedure to impute the ability to borrow to households in the Panel Survey on
Income Dynamics. In contrast, we have information on the ability to borrow and on consumption growth
for the same households.
With respect to liquid assets held at job loss we, like Gruber (2001), ﬁnd striking heterogeneity. Almost
half of job losers reported that their households had no such resources at the time of job loss. A quarter
reported that their household had liquid savings of more than three months of usual household income. An
innovation of the current paper is to emphasize that a signiﬁcant part of this variation can be understood
in terms of life-cycle considerations. We show that liquid asset holdings rise with age, and at every age
are lower for households with children present (high needs). Among older households, those with illiquid
p e n s i o nw e a l t hh o l dl e s sl i q u i dw e a l t hw i t hw h i c ht h e yc o u l ds m o o t hat e m p o r a r yi n c o m el o s s .
Turning to borrowing constraints and consumption growth, a quarter of job losers report that they could
not borrow to raise current consumption. A smaller fraction report that this constraint is binding. The
incidence of binding borrowing constraints falls with age. Those who report a binding borrowing constraint
subsequently exhibit very high consumption growth (relative to those who report not being constrained),
consistent with an inability to smooth consumption over time. However, even those who assert that they
could borrow exhibit “excess sensitivity” of consumption growth to lagged income. This is strong evidence
that excess sensitivity cannot necessarily be interpreted as evidence of binding borrowing constraints.
In the next section we develop our model. Section III outlines the implications of our model for
consumption smoothing, asset accumulation, and optimal levels of unemployment beneﬁt. Section IV
describes the data. Section V presents our empirical analysis of liquid asset holdings, borrowing constraints,
and consumption growth. Section VI concludes.
II Life-Cycle Model
Our model might best be thought of as an extension of the Bailey framework. Bailey (1978) models
the trade-oﬀ between consumption smoothing and moral hazard in a partial equilibrium framework.1 In
Bailey’s two period model, agents may lose their job between the ﬁrst and second period. They then choose
what portion of the second period to spend out of work. Crucially, utility depends only on total income in
4the second period: the fact that income may be low while out of work is immaterial. This is consistent with
the unemployed having complete access to credit markets. However, it is inconsistent with the idea that
the unemployed face borrowing constraints and may be in temporarily diﬃcult ﬁnancial circumstances.
We develop that framework as follows. First, we make time continuous in order to introduce a role for
borrowing constraints and to vary the age of job loss. Second, we introduce a retirement savings motive.
The latter allows us to vary the cost of holding assets for precautionary reasons. Our model is partial
equilibrium but closed with a government budget constraint, like the Bailey model.2
There are a number of alternatives to the ﬁnite horizon life-cycle model we develop. Hansen and
Imrohorglu (1992) model unemployment insurance in an inﬁnite horizon, calibrated dynamic general equi-
librium model . This is less suitable for our purposes of understanding the eﬀects of heterogeneity in the
cost of saving because with an inﬁnite horizon, agents must be impatient in order to keep the problem
bounded. In an inﬁnite horizon, partial equilibrium model, Lentz (2003) varies the interest rate and il-
lustrates that the value of unemployment insurance depends on the cost of saving. The lower the interest
rate, the more costly it is for them to hold a buﬀer stock of savings, and the more valuable social insurance
becomes. However, the inﬁnite horizon framework precludes Lentz from considering patient agents and
from explicitly introducing life-cycle considerations. Rendon (2003) carries out a similar exercise in a ﬁnite
horizon, allowing for some life-cycle eﬀects. His focus is on estimating structural parameters rather than
on exploring heterogeneity due to life-cycle eﬀects. Costain (1999) also works with a ﬁnite horizon model,
but allowing for general equilibrium eﬀects. His focus is on the value of unemployment insurance using
a model calibrated to median wealth holdings and so he explicitly ignores the heterogeneity in the data.
Further, like Rendon, he does not consider that heterogeneity in characteristics and in wealth may make
the value of unemployment insurance very diﬀerent for diﬀerent individuals.
A Framework and notation
Life has three stages: youth, middle-age and old age. We use subscripts to denote the life-stage and note
that life-stages may be of diﬀerent lengths. Agents are risk-averse and maximize expected utility. They
begin the ﬁrst stage (which lasts from 0 until T1) with initial assets A0(= 0). In this stage agents work for
aw a g e ,w1, and consume continuously. Individuals pay two (proportional) taxes: a pension contribution
(τr), and an unemployment insurance contribution (τu). If they choose to consume less than their net
income, they accumulate assets. As in Bailey (1978), at the end of the ﬁrst stage individuals face an
5exogenous probability (π) of job displacement. Where necessary, we use superscripts d(displaced) and
n(not displaced) to denote states of the world.
In the second stage (from T1 to T2) agents consume (and save or possibly borrow). If they are not
displaced at the end of the ﬁrst stage, they continue to earn the wage w1. If agents are displaced at the end
of the ﬁrst stage, they can return to work immediately at some wage which is strictly less than the wage
in the job from which they were displaced (w2(I =0 )<w 1). Alternatively, they may choose to invest for
time I ≤ T2−T1. During this investment period they receive a beneﬁt determined by the replacement rate
b. If I<T 2 − T1 they return to work at T1 + I , earning a wage w2(I) which is increasing in the duration
of investment (w2(0) ≤ w2(I) ≤ w1). Individuals pay only retirement taxes on unemployment beneﬁts.
We can interpret investment in a number of alternative ways: ﬁrst, investment may be search with recall
(of previous oﬀers) with longer search leading to a better match;3 second, investment may be retraining by
the unemployed with wages being higher the longer the training period; third, investment may merely be
waiting to be recalled (from temporary layoﬀ) to a job with a high wage (relative to the outside option);
ﬁnally, if we reinterpret unemployment beneﬁt as a minimum payment to the worker, investment may be
thought of as on-the-job training where workers receive a minimum payment during the training period,
but a higher wage on completion. The presence of unemployment beneﬁt may distort these investment
decisions.4
In the ﬁnal stage of life (from T2 to T3), individuals are (exogenously) retired and collect a pension,
which they consume. The size of their pension is determined solely by their contributions in the ﬁrst two
stages of life and contains no redistributive element. In retirement individuals pay no taxes. At the end of
the third stage they die with terminal assets A3 =0 . The amount of resources available for consumption
in retirement is determined by pension wealth plus liquid asset holdings not consumed in earlier stages.
In a general intertemporal consumption model, patience (broadly deﬁned as the inclination to save)
will be determined by the interest rate, the rate of time preference, the time path of needs, and the time
path of income. All may contribute to heterogeneity in patience. For example, recent studies of household
wealth (Samwick, 1998) and consumption growth (Alan and Browning, 2003) provide empirical support
of heterogeneity in the rate of time preference. Attanasio et al. (1999) show empirically that children
make households act as if they are more impatient. Nevertheless, for transparency, we choose to model
only one determinant of the agents’ inclination to save. We assume that there is no discounting or rate of
6return (δ = r =0 ). We also abstract from modelling explicitly changes in needs. This gives us ﬂat desired
consumption paths. However, we can vary impatience (again, deﬁned as the inclination to save) in this
model by varying the growth rate of income.
In our model we alter the growth rate of income through (exogenous) changes to the pension system.
With high withholding (large τr) agents face a rising income proﬁle. Such agents would like to borrow,
and saving is costly for such agents. With low withholding, agents face a falling income proﬁle and wish
to save. This is crucial because it will allow us to explore the value of unemployment insurance to agents
f o rw h o mi ti sm o r eo rl e s sc o s t l yt oh o l ds a v i n g s .
Savings motives are not additive: liquid assets held for precautionary reasons (smoothing consumption
in the face of a temporary income loss) can be consumed in retirement if the negative shock is not realised.
Equally, liquid assets held for retirement purposes may be partially used for precautionary reasons if
unexpected shocks occur. This point is also emphasized by Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes (2002) who argue
that precautionary savings and savings for a bequest motive cannot be distinguished. It is more costly for
an impatient agent to accumulate precautionary balances as the marginal utility of current consumption
is high (and similarly, resources that become available late in life - if the shock is not realized - have low
value).
We consider an extreme variation in the cost of borrowing, comparing cases where agents can borrow
freely (subject only to the terminal asset condition) with cases where they face an exogenous borrowing
limit At ≥− φ.
Notation in the model is summarized in Table 1 and timing in Figure 1.
B Individual Optimization Problem
We now lay out the individual optimization problem, taking b, τr,a n dτu as given. The individual
maximises




u(ct)dt + πV d
2 (A1)+( 1− π)V n
2 (A1) (1)
subject to the budget constraint
￿ T1
0
ctdt = −A1 + Y1 (1 − τr − τu)
7and, if present, the credit constraint,
A1 ≥− φ.
The solution to this problem can be characterised by the Euler equation:
∂V1
∂A1








+ µ1 =0 (2)
µ1 ≥ 0,A 1 ≥− φ. (3)
The presence of the credit constraint aﬀects equation (2) in two possible ways: ﬁrst, it may cause the
Euler equation to be violated (ie. µ1 is strictly positive); second, the constraint may bind in period 2 and






∂A1 , even though µ1 =0 .
In the absence of credit constraints, the solution is simple because the consumption path post-displacement
can be separated from the timing of income: individuals displaced in the second stage choose investment
simply to maximise income,5
max
I
w2 (I)(T2 − T1 − I)(1− τu − τr)+bY1I (1 − τr)
This yields the ﬁrst order condition
w 
2 (I)(T2 − T1 − I)(1− τu − τr)+bY1 (1 − τr)=w2 (I)(1− τu − τr) (4)
where the left hand side is the marginal beneﬁt of investment and the right hand side is the marginal cost
of investment, analogous to the partial equilibrium, linear utility model (Mortensen, 1986). The marginal
beneﬁt of investment is increased by the unemployment beneﬁt paid and so a positive replacement rate
induces ineﬃcient (over) investment.
This level of investment determines income post-displacement. Since there is no discounting, individuals
choose consumption to be constant in any particular state. Once we know income and hence consumption
post-displacement as a function of A1, we can solve for assets held at the end of period 1 by using the






∂A1 in equation (2) by the marginal utility of consumption in each
state.
The presence of credit constraints introduces an interaction between the investment decision and the
consumption decision because, if the constraint binds, longer investment means a longer period at lower
8consumption levels. The choice of investment depends on the consumption level in the investment period
and this in turn means investment will depend on asset holdings, A1. To solve the problem with the credit
constraint, we have to solve simultaneously the asset allocation equation (2) and for optimal investment
(equation (8) below).
After displacement, the individual chooses the length of investment and the amount of consumption to
solve
V d









ctIdt = A1 − A1+I + bY1I (1 − τr) (6)
A1+I ≥− φ (7)
where V d
2E(A1+I,I) is the value from reemployment after investment I with remaining assets A1+I. This
recursive structure of the problem means we can solve (5) using Lagrange multipliers from future periods,
recognising that the credit constraint may bind after reemployment if impatience is high enough (see
appendix).









+ u(c2I)+λ2IbY1 (1 − τr) − λ2Ic2I
where ∂V d
2E/∂I is the marginal beneﬁt of further investment realised once reemployed and λ2I is the
Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint in the investment stage in period 2, equation (6). Using the
solution for ∂V d
2E/∂I derived in the appendix, and rearranging,
w  (I)(T2 − T1 − I)[λ2E (1 − τr − τu)+λ3τr]+bY1 [λ2I (1 − τr)+λ3τr]
= w(I)[λ2E (1 − τr − τu)+λ3τr]+Ψ (8)
The left hand side of equation (8) is the marginal beneﬁt of investment and the right hand side is
the marginal cost of investment, analogous to condition (4). The marginal beneﬁt of investment includes
9unemployment beneﬁt and the resulting increase in the future wage. Here (and in contrast to condition 4)
both are weighted by marginal utility terms which are share weighted averages of the marginal utilities in
the stages in which the relevant resources will be realized.
The ﬁrst term in the marginal cost is the (forgone) wage, again valued at a share weighted average
of the marginal utilities in the periods in which it is received (note that because of the mandatory pen-
sion contributions, a fraction of current earnings is received in retirement). The second term Ψ can be
approximated by
Ψ ≈ γ∆c2Eu  (c2E), (9)
where γ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion which captures the degree of aversion to ﬂuctuations
in consumption. The term Ψ is a utility cost term associated with the failure to smooth consumption
between the investment and earnings substages of period 2.6 The presence of Ψ increases the marginal cost
of investment because consumption is no longer smoothed over substages in a way that would have occurred
if there had been no credit constraints. The size of this cost is increasing in the degree of ﬂuctuation aversion
and would be zero if utility were linear. This reduces investment below the level of investment that would
occur if unconstrained. Investment when constrained may potentially fall below the level which would
maximise earned income. In this case, increasing unemployment beneﬁts can induce a more eﬃcient level
of search.
For given values of τr,τu and b,w ec a nn o ws o l v ef o rA1 and I using equations (2) and (4) if uncon-
strained, or equations (2) and (8) if constrained. We solve for τu to balance the budget as discussed in the
next subsection.
C Government Budget Constraints
Unemployment beneﬁt is ﬁnanced in our model by the tax τu and we set τu to balance the government
budget constraint. Ignoring the government budget constraint would mean increases in unemployment
duration associated with more generous beneﬁts do not introduce extra costs.
The budget constraint for the unemployment insurance system is:
τu (w1T1 + πw2(I∗)((T2 − T1) − I∗)+( 1− π)w2(T2 − T1)) = πI∗bY (10)
This implies that the budget is set to balance across individuals and there is redistribution from workers
to the unemployed. Because there is no aggregate risk, we can alternatively say that the budget balances
10in expectation and so insurance is actuarially fair.
Budget balance in the pension system is imposed by each individual receiving the sum of their earlier
contributions as retirement income: Y3 = τr(Y1 + Y2 (I)). This implies that the pension system contains
no element of redistribution between individuals and no notion of insurance.7
III Implications of the Model
In this section, we use our model to show the implications of the cost of saving, borrowing constraints
and unemployment insurance for individual saving, consumption smoothing and investment behaviour.
We then use these implications to derive optimal beneﬁt levels which vary with the cost of saving and
borrowing. Implications of the model are demonstrated partly analytically and partly numerically.






and a simple investment function, w(I)=Iη.Parameters used are summarised in Table 2. We explore
variation in replacement rates, variation in the timing of layoﬀ and variation in the patience of agents. As
noted above, the latter is controlled by the pension tax (τr) which controls the growth rate of expected
income. With low τr agents anticipate low income in the future and save; with high τr agents anticipate
high income in the future and would like to borrow.
A Consumption and Saving
From the ﬁrst-order conditions of the individual optimisation problem, in the absence of borrowing con-
straints, or if the constraints do not bind, marginal utility is smoothed over time (at least in expectation):
λ1 = πλ2d +( 1− π)λ2n
λ2I = λ2E = λ2d = λ3d
λ2n = λ3n
but not smoothed over states:
λ2n  = λ2d
The ﬁniteness of life means that households cannot perfectly self-insure even in the absence of borrowing
constraints. Unemployment insurance has what we term an “insurance beneﬁt”, in that it helps to smooth
11marginal utility across states, reducing λ2d− λ2n which is the “permanent shock” of job loss (See also
Browning and Crossley, 2001). This is the beneﬁt of unemployment insurance that operates in the Bailey
model.
If credit constraints bind, then from the ﬁrst-order conditions,
λ1 = πλ2I +( 1− π)λ2n + µ1
λ2I = λ2E + µ2I = λ3d + µ2I + µ2E
λ2n = λ3n + µ2n
Marginal utility is again only partially smoothed over states (λ2d  = λ2n), but in addition, marginal utility
is only partially smoothed over time after job loss (λ2I  = λ2E  = λ3d).B yr e d u c i n gλ2I − λ2E unemploy-
ment insurance can have another beneﬁt (beyond the insurance beneﬁt noted above): it helps to smooth
consumption over time. This consumption smoothing beneﬁt of unemployment insurance is absent in the
Bailey (1978) model because post-displacement, consumption is independent of labour market state.
Figure 2 displays the time paths of assets and consumption for simulations of our model with diﬀerent
parameter values. The left hand side panel present time paths for agents who are able to borrow; the
right hand side panels present time paths for agents who are unable to borrow. Moving from top to
bottom the panels are diﬀerentiated by a decreasing cost of saving. In the top panels a very high value
for pension withholdings is chosen which has the eﬀect of making additional savings costly and agents
very impatient (they would like to bring resources forward from the future.) In the bottom panels illiquid
pension contributions are very low, the income proﬁle is downward sloping, agents have a strong life-cyle
(retirement) savings motive, and hence are patient. The middle panels present an intermediate case.
When agents are able to borrow, consumption is equalized across time (after the shock is realised) and
the consumption path is independent of the timing of income. However, because time diversiﬁcation is
limited by the ﬁniteness of life, consumption is not completely equalized across states. Patient agents (row
iii in Figure 2) smooth by saving and their holdings of liquid assets increase with age until retirement, while
impatient agents (row i) smooth by borrowing and their borrowing increases with age until retirement.
This implies that as the cost of saving increases, individuals save less, and then borrow if the cost of saving
becomes high enough.
The right hand column of Figure 2 shows that a similar results holds when individuals are unable to
12borrow: as the cost of saving increases, individuals save less, and then want to borrow if the cost of saving
becomes high enough. Because patient agents have suﬃcient liquid wealth to smooth without borrowing,
their time paths of consumption are unaﬀected by their inability to borrow (row iii). By contrast, impatient
agents who cannot borrow do not fully smooth consumption across time after job loss and consumption
rises at reemployment (rows i and ii).
B Eﬀects of Varying the Replacement Rate
We show the eﬀects of varying the replacement rate on savings, consumption loss on unemployment and
investment behaviour.
Saving Figure 3 shows the extent of asset accumulation (A1) for diﬀerent replacement rates and for
diﬀerent costs of saving and borrowing. Figure 4 shows corresponding saving rates. For both ﬁgures,
each row represents a diﬀerent cost of saving, and in each panel we show the case where agents are able to
borrow and the case where agents are unable to borrow. The two columns in each ﬁgure represent diﬀerent
ages when job loss may occur.
Figure 3 reinforces that the extent of liquid asset holdings and the ability to self-insure depends on the
cost of saving: greater forced retirement saving or greater impatience lead to lower liquid asset holdings.
This result holds whether or not individuals are able to borrow. However, Figure 3 shows that the inability
to borrow leads to greater asset holdings relative to the case where individuals are able to borrow. Further,
row (ii)i nF i g u r e3s h o w st h a tb o r r o w i n gc o n s t r a i n t sc a nl e a dt og r e a t e ra s s e th o l d i n g se v e ni fa s s e t
holdings are positive in the unconstrained case.
Asset accumulation in this model is for partly for precautionary reasons and partly to fund consumption
in retirement. Assets not needed for precautionary reasons can instead be consumed in retirement. In this
context, an increase in unemployment insurance will crowd out liquid asset holdings,8 but the extent of
the crowd-out will depend on the substitutability between asset motives: crowd-out is greater when liquid
assets are not used for consumption in retirement (row i in Figure 3).
Figure 3 and 4 show the eﬀect of earlier job loss. Figure 3 shows that asset holdings at job loss do not
diﬀer signiﬁcantly with age of job loss for the baseline and very impatient cases. This similar level of asset
holdings means a greater savings rate (Figure 4) when job loss is earlier in life. For patient individuals,
the credit constraint the savings rate does not vary with age of job loss. Finally, when job loss is earlier,
13the crowding out eﬀect of the replacement rate on the savings rate is more marked.
Consumption Loss In Figure 5 simulations of the model are used to generate plots of ∆lnct against
the unemployment replacement rate for agents that diﬀer by patience, age at job loss and access to credit
markets. In all cases, consumption loss decreases as beneﬁts increase, but among the impatient (row i)a n d
intermediate agents (row ii) the loss is greater and the relationship is steeper when borrowing is restricted.
In other words, unemployment is more costly and unemployment beneﬁt provides more insurance when
saving and borrowing are costly. Self-insurance is also harder against job loss early in life and Figure 5
shows that consumption loss is greater for job losses earlier in life.9
Investment Equation (8) in section B shows how the return to investment depends on the presence of
borrowing constraints. This is illustrated by the simulations presented in Figure 6. Each panel plots the
duration of investment against the replacement rates. The six panels diﬀer by the assumed patience of the
agent and by the timing of job loss. Among the impatient agents and agents of intermediate patience,
borrowing constraints lead to under-investment, and eﬃcient search durations are induced by positive
replacement rates. This is particularly the case when job loss happens earlier in life. As we saw in the pre-
ceding analysis of consumption smoothing, the very patient agents are unaﬀected by borrowing constraints
(because they have considerable liquid savings). As with consumption, heterogeneity in impatience only
matters for search behaviour if individuals are unable to borrow.
C Optimal Beneﬁts
We have shown that the cost of saving and the ability to borrow matter for understanding how individuals
behave in response to unemployment insurance. This raises the issue of how optimal unemployment
insurance depends on the cost of saving and the ability to borrow. We show the dependence on the ability
to borrow analytically ignoring the retirement stage and the retirement tax. We then show the dependence
on the cost of saving through numerical calculations of optimal beneﬁts in the complete model varying the
retirement tax.
We calculate the marginal beneﬁt of increasing the replacement rate, ∂V1/∂b, from equation (1) and


















where λi = ∂u/∂ci with i ∈{ 1,n,I,D} corresponding to stage 1, the non-displaced stage, the investment
stage post job loss and the earnings sub-stage after returning to work, respectively. We use the envelope
theorem to ignore indirect eﬀects of changing beneﬁts operating through optimised values of I,A1,A 1+I.

































The left hand side represents the marginal beneﬁt of an increased replacement rate if job loss occurs.
The right hand side represents the marginal costs which arise due to a higher tax rate. Higher taxes impose
a cost in the ﬁrst stage. They also impose a cost throughout the second stage if no job loss occurs and
after return to work if job loss occurs. We want to focus, however, on the gross marginal beneﬁt. The
marginal beneﬁt depends on the consumption diﬀerences in the square brackets: the ﬁrst is the diﬀerence
in consumption between the “no job loss” state and the “reemployed” state, the second is the diﬀerence in
consumption at the time of search and consumption in the future after reemployment. The ﬁrst of these
terms is the beneﬁt of smoothing over states, the second is the beneﬁt of smoothing over time. If there were
no credit constraints, this second beneﬁt would be absent because consumption would be smooth after job
loss.10 Both terms are multiplied by γ : this represents the utility cost of consumption not being smooth.
With more general utility, the term on the ﬁrst consumption diﬀerence would be risk aversion, whereas the
term on the second would be ﬂuctuation aversion.
Put another way, borrowing constraints limit the time diversiﬁcation of risk. In particular, in our model
they prevent the optimal allocation of resources (over time) in the bad state. As a consequence, they
exacerbate the diﬀerence (in marginal utility) between the two states of the world, and raise the value of
the insurance provided by the unemployment beneﬁt system.
In Figure 7 we solve numerically for the optimal replacement rate allowing for the retirement stage and
15imposing the no borrowing condition. We vary the age at which job loss may occur and we vary the cost
of holding savings through varying the retirement tax. The most striking point in the ﬁgure is the extent
of heterogeneity in optimal replacement rates: the optimal replacement rate varies from 0.17 to 0.59 even
without preference heterogeneity in risk aversion.
Further, Figure 7 highlights that the eﬀect of the borrowing constraint depends on the cost of saving:
for each age, below a given cutoﬀ value of τr, the optimal replacement rate is constant and equal to
the optimal rate without borrowing constraints. This is because the borrowing constraint is not binding
and so varying τr aﬀects the path of assets but not the path of consumption or the marginal beneﬁt
of unemployment insurance. Above this cutoﬀ value of τr, the optimal replacement rate varies but the
relationship is not monotone: as impatience increases, the optimal beneﬁt increases (because holding buﬀer
stock saving is more costly) but if impatience becomes high enough, individuals become unwilling even to
pay the insurance premium in stage 1. Alternatively, we can interpret the eﬀect of increasing τr as showing
that unemployment insurance has more value for agents who have made substantial pension contribution,
and hence do not wish to save; but has less value for agents who are privately saving for retirement and
hence have a buﬀer stock.
The optimal replacement rate declines with age at job loss. This is partly because the impact of the
shock to lifetime income is less if job loss occurs later in life, partly because the cost of accumulating saving
for self-insurance is less and partly because the moral hazard eﬀect is smaller.
A ﬁnal implication in considering the value of unemployment insurance is that for some parameterisa-
tions (for example with τr =0 .3)c r e d i tc o n s t r a i n t sc a nraise welfare. The reason is that the displaced
agent does not internalize the negative externality that her search behaviour has through the government
budget constraint. Since the borrowing constraint reduces search, it mitigates the moral hazard cost of
unemployment insurance and leaves the government able to oﬀer more insurance. Another way to think
about this is that in a second best world, the ability to control borrowing would give the government a
second instrument to reduce moral hazard, analogously to the result in Diamond and Mirrlees (1979).
IV Data, Sample and Institutional Setting
The empirical analysis in this paper is based on the 1995 Canadian Out of Employment Panel (COEP).
The Canadian Out of Employment Panels are a series of surveys commissioned by Human Resources
16Development Canada for the purposes of evaluating legislative changes to the Canadian unemployment
insurance system. The ﬂows of job separations within certain time windows formed the sampling frames
for these surveys.
Data from the 1995 survey11 contain the detailed questions on the ability and desire to borrow which
are central to the empirical work reported in this paper. The respondents in the 1995 survey lost their jobs
in the ﬁrst half of 1995, and were interviewed twice, in the third and ﬁfth quarters after job loss. Thus
the respondents were ﬁrst interviewed in the last quarter of 1995 and ﬁrst quarter of 1996. Information
was collected pertaining to their circumstances at the interview dates and retrospectively about their
circumstances prior to the end of the relevant job, and over the intervening period. Information was
collected about work, training, and job search, about household composition, consumption, income and
ﬁnances, and about beneﬁt receipt.
These data oﬀer a number of advantages. First, the data reports on assets and debts, consumption,
and borrowing constraints for the same households. So, for example, while Jappelli et al. (1998) are forced
to use data from the SCF and a two-sample instrumental variables procedure to impute the ability to
borrow to households in the PSID, we can directly examine the consumption growth of households that
do and do not report borrowing constraints. Second, the COEP is unusual in collecting a measure of total
consumption, not just food. Third, because it is a survey speciﬁcally of job losers, the data contain a large
sample of unemployed individuals. Fourth, because the COEP survey is designed around the job loss, the
timing of information is ideally suited to our purposes. For example, there is information on assets and
debts at exactly the time of job loss. With a regular panel survey such as the PSID or SIPP, we would have
to use information collected at the last interview prior to the beginning of an unemployment spell, and
with administrative data, such as that employed by Lentz (2003), information is typically annual. Finally,
a number of other data sets suﬀer from ambiguities with respect to the time period to which information
in the data pertains (see, for example, the discussion of the timing of the PSID consumption information
in Dynarski and Gruber, 1997). The COEP data do not suﬀer from such ambiguities.
There are 7818 respondents to the 1995 COEP. The COEP samples job separations of various types,
including quits, dismissals, separations due to illness, and temporary and permanent layoﬀs. In the selection
of a sample for analysis, we discard 18 respondents who did not report a separation reason. We also discard
464 individuals who, although they lost a job, reported continuing employment in a second job. Next, we
17delete from the sample 665 respondents who reported that they quit to take another job. These individuals
experienced little or no unemployment and are outside the scope of our interest. Finally we delete 1091
individuals age 25 or younger and 474 individuals over age 55, to focus on prime age workers.
Of the remaining 5015 observations, we focus on those 2922 who lived in a nuclear family (alone, with a
spouse, or spouse and children) and were the primary earner in their household. Past experience with this
data suggests that the quality of the survey responses on household ﬁnances is lower among respondents in
other family types (for example, living with their parents or with unrelated adults.) The job loss of primary
earners is of particular interest, and in focusing on primary earners, we are following much of the previous
literature (for example, Dynarski and Gruber, 1997). Of these 2922 respondents, 1659 were employed at
t h et i m eo ft h eﬁ r s ti n t e r v i e w .T h eo t h e r1 2 6 3w e r en o tw o r k i n ga tt h et i m eo fi n t e r v i e w ,t h o u g hs o m eo f
these had spells of employment between the initial job loss and the interview. The multivariate analyses
reported in the paper are based on slightly smaller samples, due to the inevitable item non-response in a
large and comprehensive survey.
One way to think about the environment from which respondents are drawn is to consider the income
shock associated with job loss. There is information on the change in monthly, take-home household income
between the month just prior to the job separation and the month prior to the ﬁrst interview. The mean
percentage change for respondents out of work at the ﬁrst interview is - 22% (median -20%). A quarter
of out-of-work respondents report income losses in excess of 39%. The modest size of the average income
shock associated with non-employment (a complete loss of individual earnings) reﬂects several factors.
The unemployment insurance system in Canada is fairly generous, with statutory replacement rates over
50% and beneﬁts lasting up to a year. Moreover, because the Canadian income tax system is progressive,
the actual (after-tax) replacement rate is often higher than the statutory rate. Against that, insurable
earnings are capped, and workers losing jobs with earnings above the maximum insurable earnings will
have an eﬀective replacement rate below the statutory rate. Both eligibility for beneﬁts and the duration
of beneﬁts depend on the extent of recent employment. However, Canada also has a second tier of income
support: a means-tested social assistance program that would be available to those who are ineligible for
beneﬁts, or whose beneﬁts expire. Finally, while we focus on the primary earners, these workers live in
households, and many of those households have other earners. Quite mechanically, if a worker provides
50% of household income prior to job loss, and faces a 60% actual replacement rate, then the job loss
18represents a shock to personal income of — 40% but to household income it is a shock of -20%. In addition,
there may be labour supply responses among other earners in the household.
V Empirical Analysis
Our model illustrates that borrowing constraints, as well as variation in the cost of saving due to life-cycle
events and the timing of income, are important determinants of the impact and value of unemployment
insurance. We now examine whether these factors are empirically important. In particular, we use the
1995 COEP data to relate liquid asset holding at job loss to life-cycle events and the timing of income, to
investigate borrowing constraints after job loss, and to relate consumption growth after job loss to those
constraints.
A Liquid Assets at Job Loss
The COEP data collects information about liquid assets with the following questions:
• Do you or someone in your household have any assets that YOU could draw on if it was really
necessary? For example, money in the bank, savings bonds or RRSPs that are cashable, or insurance
policies, etc. Please do not include ﬁxed assets such as house, cars, boats, etc.
• Roughly how much do you have available in such assets?
The respondent is then asked how these quantities have changed since the date of the job loss. This
was followed by similar questions about debt:
• Apart from cars or mortgage, do you and your household have any other debts? Please think of all
sources such as loans and credit cards.
• Roughly how much debt apart from cars or mortgage do you have?
Again the level at interview and the change since job loss were collected, allowing us to calculate the
level at job loss.
Figure 8 presents the empirical cumulative distributions of liquid assets (top left), unsecured debt (top
right) and net position (assets - debt, bottom left). All refer to the time of job loss, and are measured in
months of usual household income. The ﬁrst point to note is that almost half of job losers reported that
their households had no such resources at the time of job loss. The second striking feature of Figure 8 is the
heterogeneity in liquid assets at job loss. A quarter of our sample reported that their household had liquid
savings of more than three months of usual household income. The empirical cumulative distributions debt
19and for net positions have similar features: many zeros and striking heterogeneity. This heterogeneity in
ﬁnancial circumstances echoes that documented by Gruber (2001) using the U.S. Survey of Income and
Program Participation.
The bottom right panel of Figure 8 shows, by age, the fraction of our sample who hold at job loss (i)
liquid assets amounting to at least one month of usual household income, (ii) unsecured debt of at least
one month of usual household income, (iii) both, (iv) neither. The fraction having only debt falls with age,
while the fraction having only assets rises. At all ages a nontrivial fraction hold both liquid assets and
unsecured debt.
The next step in our analysis is to consider whether some of the observed heterogeneity in liquid assets
can be understood in terms of life-cycle considerations. As we have emphasized above, holding liquid
wealth is more costly if current income is low, or future income is expected to be high. One important
determinant of the timing of income is retirement provision. All Canadian workers participate in a public
pension scheme (either the Canada Pension Plan or the Quebec Pension Plan). However, this is only one
component of retirement provision in Canada. Workers have, of course, their own savings, and in addition
many Canadians participate in (registered) pension plans through their employer. These pension plans are
a form of illiquid wealth. All else equal, it is more costly for workers with such plans to hold a buﬀer of
liquid assets, because contributions to these plans mean that their current disposable income is lower, and
the payout of the plan means that resources on retirement will have lower marginal value. In our sample,
38% report being covered by an employer administered pension in the job that ended. A second life-cycle
consideration is that it is more costly to hold a buﬀer of liquid assets when needs are high (the current
marginal utility of income of is high.) Needs are high when children are present in the household. As
Attanasio et al. (1999) emphasize, demographic eﬀects in intertemporal allocation operate very much like
variations in private discount rates.
Figure 9 presents age proﬁles of ﬁnancial circumstances for workers losing jobs with and without an
employer sponsored pension (top panels) and with and without children present in the home (bottom
panels). The left hand panels present liquid assets at job loss (measured in months of usual household
income) while the right hand panel present net position (liquid assets - unsecured debt, again measured in
months of usual households income).
20The ﬁrst obvious point about Figure 9 is that both liquid asset holding and net position rise with age.
In the top panel of Figure 9 we further see that the for those without employer sponsored pensions, liquid
assets rise rapidly after age 45, presumably as these households accumulate retirement savings.12 This
is not true of workers with employer sponsored pensions, so that after age 45 a diﬀerence in liquid asset
holdings opens up between the two groups. This is consistent with the idea that there is considerable
substitution between personal pension wealth and household savings: as in our model, future income
implied by illiquid pension wealth lowers liquid wealth holding. While this cross-sectional evidence is only
suggestive, recent studies using pension reforms in Italy and the United Kingdom as natural experiments
support this conclusion (Attanasio and Brugiavini, 2003, Attanasio and Rohwedder, 2004.)
In the bottom panels of Figure 9 we see that at every age, households with children currently present
(and thus with high current needs) hold smaller stocks of liquid wealth.
Table 3 models the characteristics of those holding assets. The distribution of liquid asset holdings in
our data (again, measured as months of usual household income) has two important characteristics: (i) a
great many zeros, and (ii) the positives are very skewed.13 Our multivariate analysis is therefore based
on a “two-part” model (Manning, Duan and Rogers, 1987) in which the probability of positive holdings is
modelled with a probit, and the quantity of holdings (conditional on positive holdings) is modelled with a
log-linear regression.
The age proﬁle is statistically signiﬁcant in the quantity (months) of liquid assets (conditional on
positive) but not in the probability of having positive assets. Education has signiﬁcant eﬀects on both the
probability of having liquid assets and in quantity of assets conditional on having any. Respondents with
spouse present are more likely to have positive assets, and respondents who self-report visible minority
status are both less likely to have positive assets and have lower assets conditional on having any at all.
The expectation of job loss appears to increase the size of liquid asset holdings conditional on having
positive holdings, but has no eﬀect on the probability of having positive holdings. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
gender eﬀects.
The presence of children signiﬁcantly reduces both the probability of having a buﬀer of liquid assets
and the quantity of assets conditional on positive holdings. Finally, the pension-age interactions are jointly
signiﬁcant in the in the probit (for any assets) but not in the log-linear regression for the amount of
holdings, conditional on positive holdings.
21B Borrowing Constraints
It is reasonable to think that recent job losers may be more likely to be credit-constrained than the general
population.14 Casual empiricism suggests that employment status is a key criteria considered by lenders.
Moreover, investments in future earnings (either human capital or job match) are not collateralisable. The
literature on consumption smoothing during unemployment has documented higher marginal propensities
to consume out of transitory income among low wealth households. However, as discussed above, the
interpretation of this as evidence that the unemployed face borrowing constraints is problematic.
Carroll, (2001) suggests that one kind of evidence for borrowing constraints are “spikes” at zero net
assets. Note that the lower left panel of Figure 8 exhibits exactly such a “spike”. In this cumulative
distribution, the mass of observations at exactly zero net assets (about a quarter of the sample) appears
as a vertical jump at zero.
Alternative evidence for borrowing constraints comes from direct survey questions. This is the principal
evidence that we present in this paper, and, as far as we are aware, this is the ﬁrst such evidence for job
losers/unemployed. The 1995 Canadian Out of Panel asked recent job losers two sets of questions about
their ability to borrow. They were asked subjective questions as follows:
• If you needed it, COULD you borrow money from a friend, family, or a ﬁnancial institution in order
to increase your household expenditures?
If the answer to this question was negative, the respondent was then asked:
• Suppose you COULD borrow money from one of these sources at 11% interest per year, to be paid
back starting in one year. WOULD you borrow money to increase your weekly spending on household
expenses?15
A question similar to the ﬁrst of these was previously posed to low income households in Chicago, as
reported by Mayer and Jencks (1989). We take the answers to the ﬁrst question as informative about
access to credit. If a respondent says “no” to the ﬁrst question and “yes” to the second, we take them to
be reporting that they are constrained (in the sense that their Euler equation does not hold with equality.)
Second, respondents were asked a series of questions about credit applications and the outcomes of
those applications, similar to the (U.S.) Survey of Consumer Finance questions studied by Jappelli (1990).
These questions were as follows:
• At any time since your job ended on [date of job loss] did you or any member of your household apply
for a loan at a bank or ﬁnancial institution, or for credit with any credit company? (Applied)
22• Were any of your requests for credit or a loan turned down? (Declined)
• Were you, or any member of your household, given as much credit as you applied for? (Not Full
Amount)
• Were you later able to obtain the full amount you requested by reapplying to the same institution or
by applying elsewhere? (Got Later)
• Was there any time since [date of job loss] that you or any member of your household thought of
applying for credit at a particular place, but changed your mind because you thought you might be
turned down? (Discouraged)
Responses to the “subjective” questions are summarized in the top panel of Table 4. Among respondents
not working at the time of interview, more than 30 percent report that they could not borrow. The
corresponding number for those back in employment is almost 10 percentage points lower. Overall, about
a quarter of recent job losers report no access to credit. Of those who report that they are unable to
borrow, only a fraction (13 percent among those not working) report that they would borrow if they could.
Thus, only a small fraction of the sample report being “constrained” in the sense of an Euler equation
violation. However, uncertainty about future employment and the possibility that credit constraints may
bind in the future may be dampening the desire to borrow.
The bottom panel of Table 4 summarizes responses to the “objective” questions. About a quarter of
recent job losers applied for some kind of credit before the 1st interview.16 Of those, about a quarter
were constrained in the sense that their application was declined or they did not get the full amount, and
were not later able to get the full amount. Thus about 6 percent of the full sample are constrained by
this deﬁnition. Following Jappelli, we also consider a broader deﬁnition of constrained that includes those
who did not apply because they anticipated that an application would not be successful (the discouraged).
These are about 8 percent of the sample, so that about 14 percent of the sample are constrained by this
broader deﬁnition. In comparison, Jappelli (1990) ﬁnds 19 percent of households in the 1983 US Survey
of Consumer Finance report being constrained in this sense over a period of several years prior to the
interview.
Figure 10 illustrates the age patterns in our measures of credit access and credit constrained. The top
panel is based on the “subjective” questions. The sample is divided into three age groups (26-35, 36-45,
and 46-55) and each group is divided into those that are and are not employed at the time of the (ﬁrst)
interview. Among respondents aged 26-35, not in work at the interview date, 30 percent could not borrow,
23and 5 percent would if they could. The fraction that report that they could not borrow falls with age
among the employed, but rises with age among those not in work. The fraction that are constrained (can’t
borrow and would) falls with age for both the employed and unemployed.
The lower panel of Figure 10 is based on the “objective” questions. We divide the sample into the same
three age categories. However, as these questions refer to anytime since the job loss, we do not divide by
current employment status. Among the youngest group, 9% experience a binding borrowing constraint in
the sense of being unable to obtain credit for which they applied, while 18% report being constrained in
the broader sense of either being unable to obtain credit for which they applied or deciding not to apply in
anticipation of the application being unsuccessful. By either the broad or narrow measure, the incidence
of (binding) borrowing constraints falls with age. Relative to the “subjective” questions, the “objective”
questions suggest a greater incidence of binding constraints at all ages. This is quite natural because the
former refer to the time of the interview, while the latter refer to any time since the job loss.
To model the characteristics of the credit constrained, we estimate a series of probit models. We have
a core set of predictor variables including just characteristics of the respondent and her household; and an
extended set which adds type of job separation and household ﬁnancial circumstances at the time of job
loss. The results are presented in Tables 5 through 7.
Table 5 presents empirical (probit) models of the response to the “could borrow” question. We have
coded a negative response as a 1 and so these are models of the probability that the respondent is unable
to borrow. In Table 6 we turn from the issue of whether a household could borrow to the issue of whether
they face (or have faced) a binding constraint. Here a respondent is coded 1 if they report that they are
unable to borrow and would like to.
In both tables, we initially split the sample into those respondents who were not employed at the
interview date (left panel) and those that were (middle panel). In both tables, likelihood ratio tests
indicated that we could not reject pooling the employed and unemployed (allowing for an intercept shift)
when using the richer speciﬁcation. This was not true, however, for the sparser speciﬁcation. Accordingly,
we also estimated the extended model - augmented with a dummy for employed at the interview - on the
pooled sample.
Across samples and speciﬁcations, some common patterns emerge. Women are more likely to be unable
to borrow, as are the less educated and visible minorities. Households with liquid assets or owning their
24home are more likely to be able to borrow. The home ownership eﬀect is partially oﬀset by having a
mortgage. Current non-employment appears to have an independent eﬀect (reducing ability to borrow)
even after controlling for other factors. These eﬀects are economically signiﬁcant. For example, college
education reduces the probability of being unable to borrow by between a quarter and a half.
Turning to Table 6, we see fewer statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects, in part because we are modelling an
infrequent event. Nevertheless, visible minorities, those with little education and non home-owners are
more likely to experience a binding borrowing constraint.
Table 7 explores the alternative measure of constrained which is based on the “objective” questions (the
broad measure, including “discouraged”). Since these questions refer to the entire period since the initial
job loss, we pool those who are currently working with those that are not. In other respects, we follow the
previous two tables: we estimated two probit models, a sparse speciﬁcation and a richer empirical model.
Once again, the less educated and visible minorities are more likely to be constrained. Households with
liquid assets or owning their home are less likely to be constrained. Pre-existing unsecured debt increases
the likelihood of being constrained.
A natural question is whether our measures of borrowing constraints identify the same set of households
as traditional approaches (based on wealth or liquid asset measures). Table 8 addresses this question. We
construct two measures: whether the household had any liquid assets at all, and whether they had at least
2 months usual income in liquid assets. The latter is similar to the measure used by Zeldes (1989). We
construct both these measures at job loss and at the ﬁrst interview. The ﬁrst column of Table 8 gives the
actual agreement between the various measures - the fraction of the sample for which a pair of measures
takes the same values (note that all the measures are binary). In considering the agreement between two
measures, it is important to note that the further the means of the two measures are from .5, the greater
the degree of agreement that one would expect to arise simply by chance. The second column of Table
8 gives the degree of agreement between each pair of measures that one would expect to arise by chance.
The third column of Table 8 gives the Kappa statistic, which measures the degree of actual agreement,
accounting for the degree of agreement which would arise by chance. A value of 0 indicates the same
agreement as would arise by chance. A value of 1 indicates complete agreement. Table 8 illustrates that
there is a statistically signiﬁcant degree of agreement between all the pairs of measures, but agreement is by
no means perfect. Whether the household has any assets seems to be a slightly better measure of whether
25they face borrowing constraints than whether they had 2 months of assets. On balance, our subjective
and objective measures of borrowing constraints agree more strongly with each other than with the asset
measures.
C Consumption Growth
The ﬁnal element of our empirical analysis is to examine the consumption growth of households between
the ﬁrst interview in the third quarter after job loss and second interview in the ﬁfth quarter after job loss.
Consumption growth is deﬁned as the change in the logarithm of total expenditure. This is divided by the
number of weeks between the ﬁrst and second interview to give an annual rate. In Table 9 we report a
series of consumption growth regressions. The ﬁrst column of Table 9 reports a regression of consumption
growth on a constant, age, the change in household size between the ﬁrst and second interview, and dummy
variables capturing the responses to the subjective questions regarding ability and desire to borrow at the
ﬁrst interview. Those who report a binding constraint (report that they could not borrow, but would if they
could) exhibit very high consumption growth. Their consumption growth is statistically (and economically)
diﬀerent from the rest of the sample. The consumption growth of those who say they could not borrow,
but are not constrained, is not statistically diﬀerent from those who say they could borrow.
The remaining columns report consumption growth regressions that have the form of excess sensitivity
tests. In particular, we regress consumption growth on a constant, age, the change in household size, and
lagged income. The idea is that, to the extent that it is in the information set at the ﬁrst interview, lagged
income should not predict consumption growth between the ﬁrst and second interview. The second column
of Table 9 indicates that lagged income does predict consumption growth among our respondents. The third
and fourth columns of Table 9 indicate that this correlation is driven by those households with no liquid
assets. These kinds of result are sometimes taken as evidence of liquidity constraints (as in Zeldes, 1989),
and the heterogeneity by wealth levels echoes previous ﬁndings (both in the literature on consumption
smoothing over unemployment and in the broader consumption literature). In the ﬁnal two columns, we
successively eliminate from the sample those who report a binding borrowing constraint (cannot borrow
but would) and those who cannot borrow. Here our empirical strategy is very similar to Jappelli et al.
(1998) except that we have exact (rather than imputed) information on borrowing constraints. Our results
indicate that excess sensitivity is not limited to those who report a binding borrowing constraint, or even to
those who report they cannot borrow. This suggests that the excess sensitivity must arise, at least in part,
26for other reasons, such as the nonseparability of consumption and labour supply, or because of correlations
between lagged income and future uncertainty. Because we do not ﬁnd excess sensitivity among high
wealth households, the latter explanation is particularly attractive.17 The bottom line, however, is that
in interpreting excess sensitivity and high marginal propensities to consume out of transitory income as
evidence of binding borrowing constraints, the literature on consumption smoothing during unemployment
may have overestimated the empirical importance of binding borrowing constraints.
VI Conclusions
In this paper, we have emphasized a series of related ideas. Unemployment insurance is more valuable
when self-insurance is more diﬃcult. Self-insurance is more diﬃcult when the cost of borrowing and the
cost of saving are high. The cost of borrowing depends on credit markets, and in particular, is eﬀectively
inﬁnite for households facing a binding borrowing constraint. The cost of savings depends on the timing of
income and the timing of needs, as well as private and market discount rates. Heterogeneity in these factors
could lead to the empirical heterogeneity in asset holdings, and in marginal propensities to consume, that
has been documented among job losers. Heterogeneity in these factors would also imply diﬀerences in the
value of unemployment insurance.
We developed a simple life-cycle model to illustrate these connections. Our model illustrates that
in the presence of borrowing constraints unemployment insurance may have an additional beneﬁt that
derives from smoothing consumption over time after job loss. Borrowing constraints can also dampen the
moral hazard. These eﬀects of borrowing constraints can raise the optimal replacement rate. In addition,
optimal replacement rates vary substantially with the age at job loss and the strength of the retirement
saving motive. In our model, these are the factors that determine the cost of accumulating and holding a
buﬀer stock.
Empirically, we provided new evidence on the ﬁnancial resources of job losers, on the incidence of bor-
rowing constraints after job loss and on subsequent consumption growth. There is enormous heterogeneity
in liquid asset holdings at job loss. Life-cycle circumstances that alter the costs of savings explain some of
this variation. For example, holdings of liquid assets that can be used to buﬀer employment shocks rise
with age; are lower for households with children (high needs); and are lower for households with (illiquid)
pension wealth.
27With respect to the empirical importance of borrowing constraints, the data deliver a mixed message.
On the one hand, while twenty-ﬁve percent of job losers report that they could not borrow, a much smaller
fraction report being “constrained” in the sense that they would borrow if they could. Both groups are
signiﬁcantly smaller than (and not a strict subset of) the set of households that report having no liquid
assets at job loss. Moreover, “excess sensitivity” (of consumption growth to lagged income) is not limited
to those who report being constrained, or even to those who report that they could not borrow. Thus
the literature may have been too quick to interpret high marginal propensities to consume among low
wealth job losers as evidence of borrowing constraints. Precautionary saving against the risk of ongoing
unemployment or employment instability (and also the related risk that borrowing constraints may bind
in the future) is likely to play an important role.
On the other hand, even in the context of a fairly generous Canadian unemployment insurance system, a
small group of job losers report experiencing binding credit constraints and exhibit very high consumption
growth - suggesting that they are unable to smooth consumption over time, and that they experience
signiﬁcant hardship. Further, as ﬁrst stressed by Deaton (1991), even if borrowing constraints do not bind,
the inability to borrow can interact with uncertainty to aﬀect both behaviour and welfare.
Ongoing uncertainty is not present in our model, or in the Bailey model, where there is only one point
in time at which job loss may occur. Models with ongoing uncertainty are unlikely to yield many analytical
results. They can of course, be approached numerically. A key challenge is to do so in ways that remain
ﬂexible with respect to the cost of savings, and the patience of agents.
The life-cycle approach to unemployment insurance taken in this paper suggests a number of important
policy implications. An obvious implication is that the design of public pensions and public unemployment
insurance systems are interdependent. To the extent that public pensions mean that workers retirements
savings are not available to smooth a temporary income shock (either directly or as collateral) they may
make unemployment insurance more valuable.
However, the most important implication of our analysis is that models that ignore the kind of het-
erogeneity we have documented are likely to provide an incomplete guide to policy. Our data contain
many workers for whom unemployment insurance has little value. Because circumstances or other savings
motives makes it easy for them to hold a buﬀer of liquid assets, or because they have good access to credit
markets, self-insurance is a reasonable option. For other workers in our data, this is not the case. Even
28without redistribution between groups, the optimal single unemployment insurance system must depend
on the weight society places on the welfare of diﬀerent groups. Moreover, diﬀerential beneﬁts by age or
family type (for example, higher beneﬁts to families with children) may be desirable on insurance grounds
alone. This is because the cost of self-insurance, and hence the value of unemployment insurance, may
diﬀer across ages and family types. Of course, this needs to be balanced against diﬀerences across groups
in the extent of moral hazard.
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31Notes
1The most common framework for thinking about the moral hazard induced by unemployment insurance is search models.
In these search models agents typically income maximize, and this is justiﬁed by assuming either linear utility (risk neutrality)
or perfect insurance. Thus such models preclude consumption smoothing beneﬁts.
2We believe that because wealth distributions are so highly skewed, and capital markets open, it is reasonable to model
users of unemployment insurance systems as price takers in capital markets. A second potential general equilibrium eﬀect is
the eﬀect of unemployment insurance on the vacancy posting behaviour of ﬁrms (ﬁrms’ vacancy decisions do not take into
account the positive externality on other ﬁrms of creating a “thicker” market). Similarly, we do not capture the negative
externality of search on the probability of other people ﬁnding jobs. These general equilibrium and externality eﬀects may be
important but are beyond the scope of this paper.
3It is possible that wages decline if unemployment is too long. In the current model, there is no uncertainty about job
oﬀer arrival, and so if there were no unemployment beneﬁt, we would be able to ignore the part of the investment schedule
which is declining.
4In the Bailey model, moral hazard arises due to the utility of leisure in the second stage. We model moral hazard as
arising through the investment decision to allow the possibility that search during unemployment is productive.
5Noting that the pension tax paid in stage 2 is returned in stage 3.
6If the credit constraint is not binding, Ψ=0and λ2I = λ2E = λ3 and so equation (8) reduces to equation (4).
7If there were only one government budget constraint, pension provision could contain an element of redistribution by
providing “pension credits” for periods in unemployment. Similarly we do not consider redistribution across individuals who
face diﬀerent job loss risk, π, or diﬀerent loss of potential earnings. Our focus is the on the non-redistributive aspects of
unemployment insurance.
8Engen and Gruber (2001) estimate the extent unemployment insurance crowds out precautionary saving.
9Gruber (1997) and Browning and Crossley (2001) both estimate regression equations of the form:
∆lnct = Xβ+ αb + e
where legislative variation (across time, or time and jurisdictions) is used to estimate α. Gruber interprets his estimate of α
as an estimate of the insurance beneﬁts of unemployment insurance (and uses that estimate in optimal beneﬁt calculations
based on the Bailey model). In contrast, Browning and Crossley set out an explicit (Euler equation) framework in which
α captures the eﬀect on consumption growth of a binding credit constraint. In terms of the model presented here, Gruber
interprets α as λ2d− λ2n, while Browning and Crossley interpret α = λ2I − λ2E = µI.
10This equation is similar to equation (2) in Chetty (2004) except for the beneﬁt of smoothing over time and taxes are paid
in the ﬁrst stage in our model.
11The survey was conducted by the Special Surveys Division of Statistics Canada, and further details are available at:
http://www.statcan.ca/english/IPS/Data/72M0001XCB.htm.
12In matching a life-cycle model with impatience and precautionary savings to the life-cycle consumption proﬁles, Gourinchas
and Parker (2003) estimate that households begin to accumulate substantial retirement savings after age 45. Carroll (1997)
ﬁnds a somewhat later date.
13The latter, for example, means that the normality assumption of a Tobit model is certainly violated.
14There is a substantial literature which attempts to establish the incidence of credit constraints in general populations.
32“Excess sensitivity” (Euler equation) studies (Zeldes, 1989, Runkle, 1991) and the analysis of direct survey questions (Jappelli,
1990) have already been mentioned. More recently, Gross and Souleles (2003) provide interesting evidence of binding borrowing
constraints based on responses to changes in credit card borrowing limits.
15Nominal prime interest rate at this time in Canada was about 7%.
16The data contain some information on the type of credit our respondents applied for. Personal loans, car loans and credit
cards were the most common. Although the respondents could list up to 3 diﬀerent kinds of credit, more than 90% listed
only one type. Thus we can also calculate rough rejection rates by type of credit. These were much higher for unsecured debt
(credit cards and consolidation loans) than for secured debt (car loans and mortgages).
17Moreover, the results in this table are robust to conditioning on changes in employment.
33I Referees’ Appendix: Solving the Model
This appendix describes explicitly the recursive solution of the model. We solve for the optimal choices of
consumption at each stage and investment after job loss. The tax rate, τu, is determined by the government
revenue equation in the text. The system reduces to 3 nonlinear equations determining A1,I and τu which
we solve numerically.
Stage 3: In the third (retirement) stage of life, the value function is








ctdt = A2 + τr(Y1 + Y2 (I)) (13)
where I = −1 indicates the individual was not displaced in period 2. Note that the borrowing constraint,
if present, is irrelevant because the constraint that terminal assets are zero and the assumption that δ =0
mean consumption is spread evenly through the stage. Associating λ3 with the budget constraint (13) and












These expressions are used in solving for assets and investment in earlier stages.
Stage 2 (not displaced): In the second stage there are two cases: displaced (d)o rn o t( n). If the agent
is not displaced, her value function is
V n








ctdt = A1 − A2 + Y n
2 (1 − τr − τu) (14)
1As with stage 3, consumption will be constant within the stage. Associating the multiplier λ2n with







+ µ2n =0 (15)
µ2n ≥ 0,A 2n ≥− φ.
If there is no borrowing constraint, or the constraint is not binding, µ2n =0and consumption will be
smooth between stages 2 and 3.
Stage 2 (displaced): No credit constraint We consider optimal choices after displacement ﬁrst for
the case with no credit constraint and in the next subsection for the case with credit constraints.
If the worker is displaced her value function is
V d








ctdt = A1 − A2 + bY1I (1 − τr)+Ed
2(I)(1− τr − τu) (16)
0 ≤ I ≤ T2 − T1 (17)
As before, consumption will be constant within the stage. Associating the multiplier λ2d with constraint







− λ2d =0 (18)
Since we know consumption in the ﬁnal period, we can solve directly for consumption in period 2 and for
λ2d.
Turning to investment behaviour, the absence of a credit constraint means that the choice over I can
be considered independently from the choice of A2..
Stage 2 (displaced): With credit constraint
The presence of the credit constraint means the timing of income within the second stage may matter.
The length of investment and the path of consumption will be jointly determined rather than being sep-
arable decisions as in the absence of credit constraints. Therefore, it is useful to divide the stage into an
earnings and an investment substage.
2Earnings sub-stage
V d








ctdt = A1 − A2 + Ed
2(I)(1− τr − τu) (19)
A2 ≥− φ (20)








− λ2E + µ2E =0 (21)
µ2E ≥ 0,A 2 ≥− φ






























ctIdt = A1 − A1+I + bY1I (1 − τr) (24)
A1+I ≥− φ (25)
Associating the multiplier λ2I with the ﬁrst constraint and µ2I with the second constraint, gives the








− λ2I + µ2I +0 (26)
µ2I ≥ 0,A 1+I ≥− φ
3The equation determining investment is given by the ﬁrst-order condition from maximising equation








+ u(c2I)+λ2IbY1 (1 − τr) − λ2Ic2I




[λ3τr + λ2E (1 − τr − τu)] + bY1 [λ2I (1 − τr)+λ3τr]
= u(c2E) − u(c2I)+λ2Ic2I − λ2Ec2E.
Using the deﬁnition of Ed
2, this can be rearranged as:
w  (I)(T2 − T1 − I)[λ3τr + λ2E (1 − τr − τu)] + bY1 [λ2I (1 − τr)+λ3τr] (27)
= w(I)[λ3τr + λ2E (1 − τr − τu)] + Ψ (28)
where we deﬁne Ψ by
Ψ=[ u(c2E) − u(c2I)] − [λ2Ec2E − λ2Ic2I].
Taking a ﬁrst-order approximation to u(c2E) around c2I and substituting gives
Ψ=u  (c2I)c2E − λ2Ec2E
=( u  (c2I) − u  (c2E))c2E
Taking an approximation for u  (c2E) around c2I








(c2E − c2I)u  (c2E)
which gives
Ψ ≈ γ∆c2Eu  (c2E),
where γ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion which captures the degree of aversion to ﬂuctuations in
consumption.
4II Referees’ Appendix: Deriving Optimal Beneﬁt
In the text we provide brief derivation of an expression to show the trade-oﬀ in setting the optimal beneﬁt.
This appendix provides the details of the derivation.
We assume there is no third period in the model and so no retirement tax and no assets are held at the
end of the second period.




u(ct)dt + πV d
2 (A1)+( 1− π)V n
2 (A1)
Substituting in optimal values for consumption, investment and saving at each stage:
V1 = u(


















T2 − T1 − I∗
￿





1 + Y n




We take the derivative with respect to the replacement rate, b, and substitute λi = ∂u/∂ci, where i ∈
{1,n,I,E} correspond, respectively, to stage 1, the non-displaced stage, the investment sub-stage post job
loss and the earnings sub-stage after returning to work. We use the envelope theorem to ignore indirect




































We take ﬁrst-order approximations of marginal utility around consumption in the state with no job loss,
cn,
λi ≈ λn − u   (cn)(cn − ci)
π
￿




(λn − u   (cn)(cn − cE))
￿










u   (cn)(cn − c1)
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u  (cn)
































































































































































Finally, putting the marginal beneﬁt terms on the left hand side and the marginal cost terms (through

































Table 1: Notation and Earnings
ct : consumption at time t ￿r : social security tax
As : assets at end of stage s ￿u : unemployment insurance tax
ws : wage in stage s b : unemployment bene￿t
Ys : gross income for stage s (replacement ratio)
Es : gross earnings for stage s I : duration of investment
Gross Earnings Gross Income
(earnings + bene￿ts)
Stage 1 E1 = w1T1 Y1 = E1
Stage 2 Ed
2 = (T2 ￿ T1 ￿ I)w2(I) Y d
2 = E2 + bY1I
(displaced)
Stage 2 En




Stage 3 E3 = 0:0 Y i
3 = ￿r(Y1 + Y i
2)
All earned income in stages 1 and 2 is subject to tax at a rate ￿r + ￿u. Income
from unemployment bene￿t is subject to a tax at rate ￿r.









￿r 0.05, 0.30, 0.45
Total length of life remains ￿xed at 3 units. Variation in age at job loss through
varying T1 means age at job loss varies from age 25 through to age 55, if we interpret
1 unit of time as being 20 years.
Table 3: Liquid Asset Holdings at Job Loss
Probit Regression
A > 0 Log A jA > 0
Male 0.000 (.026) 0.005 (.092)
Age 0.033 (.036) 0.374 (.118)
Age45 -0.027 (.107) -0.156 (.352)
High school 0.109 (.025) 0.296 (.095)
University or College 0.180 (.028) 0.391 (.108)
Spouse Present 0.085 (.028) 0.088 (.099)
Visible Minority -0.072 (.028) -0.230 (.103)
Expected job to end -0.015 (.023) 0.177 (.081)
Children present -0.096 (.025) -0.260 (.09)
No Pensiony -0.091 (.055) 0.086 (.194)
No Pension * Agey -0.030 (.044) -0.056 (.153)
No Pension * Age45y 0.155 (.136) 0.322 (.463)
Number of obserations 2105 1187
Self-reports, 1995 COEP, 1st Interview (3rd quarter after separation from a job). Num-
bers in bold indicate that the underlying parameter is individually statistically signif-
icant at a 10% level. For probit, estimates are marginal e⁄ects (standard error of
marginal e⁄ect). For the discrete variables, marginal e⁄ects are calculated for the
change in a dummy variable from zero to one, at the means of all other variables. For
the age variables, age is measured in decades and speci￿ed as a linear spline with a
knot at 45 years of age.
y Test of joint signi￿cance of the pension variables: For probit, ￿2(3) = 26:38,(Prob >
￿2) < 0:001 For regression, test of joint signi￿cance of the pension variables:












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5Table 7: Credit Application Rejected or Discouraged (Probit)
Male -0.011 (.018) -0.001 (.017)
Age -0.043 (.014) -0.019 (.014)
Age45 -0.038 (.052) -0.033 (.050)
High school -0.013 (.017) -0.005 (.016)
University or College -0.064 (.018) -0.052 (.018)
Spouse Present -0.090 (.021) -0.033 (.024)
Children present 0.011 (.018) 0.017 (.017)






Spouse Employed -0.026 (.019)
Household had liquid assets -0.033 (.015)
Household had other debt 0.089 (.014)
Number of obserations 2102
Pseudo R2 0.042. 0.091.
Mean = 0.147
Self-reports, 1995 COEP, 1st Interview (3rd quarter after separation from a job).
Marginal e⁄ects (standard error of marginal e⁄ect). Dependent variable = 1 if the respondent self
reports that they have had an application for credit declined or that they were discouraged from
applying at any time since job loss, and = 0 otherwise. Omitted categories are: less than high
school education, layo⁄, no expectation of recall. For the age variables, age is measured in decades
and speci￿ed as a linear spline with a knot at 45 years of age. Marginal e⁄ects are calculated for
the change in a dummy variable from zero to one, at the means of all other variables. Numbers in
bold indicate that the underlying parameter is statistical signi￿cant at a 10% level. The measure
of Pseudo R2 is 1 ￿ L1=L0.
6Table 8: Kappa Statistics
Correlates Actual Expected Kappa (s.e.)
Agreement Agreement
Hold any Unable to borrowy 57.04 46.80 0.192 (.017)
Assets, Currently constrainedy 46.06 43.32 0.048 (.007)
A > 0 Refused credit￿ 55.92 54.35 0.0344 (.011)
Discouraged or Refused￿ 56.25 53.49 0.059 (.016)
Hold Unable to borrowy 47.21 39.83 0.123 (.013)
Assets, Currently constrainedy 30.54 28.80 0.025 (.005)
A > 2 ￿
y
12 Refused credit￿ 36.52 34.36 0.033 (.007)
Discouraged or Refused￿ 41.64 37.46 0.067 (.011)
Currently Refused credit 71.56 69.07 0.081 (.015)
Unable Discouraged or Refused 72.47 65.30 0.207 (.019)
to borrow
Currently Refused credit 91.13 89.78 0.132 (.020)
Constrained Discouraged or Refused 85.51 81.91 0.199 (.016)
Number of obserations 2423
Self-reports, 1995 COEP, 1st Interview ( 3rd quarter after separation from a job).
The column ￿expected agreement￿is the agreement that would be expected to arise
by chance. Kappa=1 indicates complete agreement, Kappa=0 indicates agreement
is the same as by chance, Kappa<0 indicates less agreement than expected by
chance. All Kappa coe¢ cients reported have p-values less than 0.001.
y The asset condition refers to asset holdings at interview date which is the same
point in time as the credit question.
￿ The asset condition refers to asset holdings at job loss which is the start of the










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Time Path of Earnings
T1 T2 T3 0
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1Figure 2: Asset and Consumption Paths
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The left hand column presents consumption and asset paths when able to borrow, the right hand
column paths when unable to borrow. The three rows represent diﬀerent levels of impatience. C is
consumption, A is the asset stock at a point in time, t is age, which ranges from 0 to 3.
2Figure 3: Asset Accumulation by Replacement Rate
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The graphs show asset holdings at job loss, normalised by the wage rate, on the y-axes and the
unemployment beneﬁt replacement rate on the x-axes. The left hand column presents the baseline.
The right hand column shows the eﬀect of earlier job loss. The wage rate before job loss, w1 is
the same in both columns. The three rows represent diﬀerent levels of impatience. The solid lines
represent the cases where the agent is unable to borrow, and the lines of dashes represent the cases
where the agent can borrow freely. In the third row (showing patient agents) the “uanble to borrow”
and “able to borrow” cases coincide.
3Figure 4: Savings Rate by Replacement Rate
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The graphs show the proportion of income saved before job loss on the y-axes and the unemployment
beneﬁt replacement rate on the x-axes. The left hand column presents the baseline. The right hand
column shows the eﬀect of earlier job loss. Wage rate before job loss, w1 i st h es a m ei nb o t hc o l u m n s ,
but T1 is smaller when job loss is earlier. The three rows represent diﬀerent levels of impatience.
T h es o l i dl i n e sr e p r e s e n t st h ec a s ew h e r et h ea g e n ti su n a b l et ob o r r o w ,a n dt h el i n e so fd a s h e s
represent the cases where the agent can borrow freely. In the third row (showing patient agents) the
“uanble to borrow” and “able to borrow” cases coincide.
4Figure 5: Consumption Loss by Replacement Rate
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The graphs show the change in consumption at job loss on the y-axes and the unemployment beneﬁt
replacement rate on the x-axes. The left hand column presents the baseline. The right hand column
shows the eﬀect of earlier job loss. The three rows represent diﬀerent levels of impatience. The solid
lines represents the case where the agent is unable to borrow, and the lines of dashes represent the
cases where the agent can borrow freely. In the third row (showing patient agents), the “uanble to
borrow” and “able to borrow” cases coincide.
5Figure 6: Investment by Replacement Rate
3 . 0 ) ( = r ii τ
05 . 0 ) ( = r iii τ




borrow    to unable   if I borrow    to able   if I earnings   max   to I
*






































The length of investment (or duration of unemployment) is shown on the y-axes and the unemploy-
ment beneﬁt replacement rate on the x-axes. The left hand column presents the baseline. In the
baseline, the length of the second stage is 1, and so the y-axes can be interpreted as the fraction of
the period spent unemployed. The right hand column shows the eﬀect of earlier job loss, where the
length of the second stage is 1.5. The three rows represent diﬀerent levels of impatience. The solid
lines represent the cases where the agent is unable to borrow, and the lines of long dashes represent
the cases where the agent can borrow freely. The optimal level of investment is indicated by the
horizontal line of short dashes.



















The optimal beneﬁt ranges from 0.17 to 0.59. Age at job loss is changed by varying T1: age 25
corresponds to T1 =0 .25 while age 55 corresponds to T1 =1 .75. Age at retirement is set at 60 by
T2 and remains constant. Fixed parameters: probability of job loss = 0.1, γ =1 .5.
7Figure 8: Distribution of Assets and Debt
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The graphs show the empirical cumulative distributions of liquid assets (top left), unsecured debt
(top right) and net position (assets - debt, bottom left). All refer to the time of job loss, and
are measured in months of usual household income. The bottom right graph shows, by age, the
fraction of the sample who hold at job loss (i) liquid assets amounting to at least one month of usual
household income, (ii) unsecured debt of at least one month of usual household income, (iii) both,
(iv) neither.



























































































































Liquid Assets Net Position
The graphs show age proﬁles of ﬁnancial circumstances for workers losing jobs with and without
an employer sponsored pension (top panels) and with and without children present in the home
(bottom panels). The left hand panels present liquid assets at job loss (measured in months of usual
household income) while the right hand panel present net position (liquid assets - unsecured debt,
again measured in months of usual households income).
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The ﬁrst graph reports responses to the “subjective” questions on credit status. The second graph
reports responses to the “objective” questions on credit status. The subjective questions refer to
status at the point in time of the interview and we split the sample by current employment status.
The objective questions refer to the whole period since job loss and we do not condition on current
e m p l o y m e n ts t a t u s .T h en u m b e rl o c a t e da b o v et h el o w e rs e c t i o no ne a c hb a rg i v e st h es i z eo ft h e
lower section. The number at the top of each bar gives the total for that age group (by employment
status for the ﬁrst graph).
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